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Scenarios Assessment and Transitions 
towards a Sustainable Euro-Mediterranean in 2030 
Rym Ayadi and Carlo Sessa 
Policy Paper No. 9 / July 2013 
In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings in the southern and eastern Mediterranean, the region has reached a 
turning point in its history, presenting as many opportunities as challenges. The European Union itself is facing 
challenging conditions following the financial and economic crises that have hit its periphery. This MEDPRO 
Policy Paper examines and assesses various possible scenarios that could play out in EU-Mediterranean 
relations over the next two decades and offers recommendations towards long-term sustainable socio-economic 
development in the region.  
he southern and eastern Mediterranean 
region has reached a turning point in its 
history, following the unprecedented 
uprisings that brought to an end decades of 
repressive authoritarian rule and amidst a global 
financial crisis that swept away years of created 
value in some countries in the developed world and 
particularly in the EU. In recent decades, European 
policy-makers seem to have equated stagnation 
with stability, choosing to cooperate with 
autocratic regimes pursuing a pragmatic self-
interested approach. Political reforms and human 
rights were sidelined, while issues such as 
combating terrorism and controlling borders to 
contain illegal migration dominated the Euro-
Mediterranean policy agenda. The final step in this 
process was the creation of the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008, which was revealed 
T
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to be a fragile edifice, dominated by France’s 
determination to inter-governmentalise Euro-
Mediterranean relations. 
Before 2010, the year of the start of the Arab 
revolts, the prevailing ‘business as usual’ (BAU) 
scenario in EU-Mediterranean relations consisted 
therefore of a blend of state un-sustainability and 
bilateral and regional cooperation dominated by 
inter-governmental relations and increasing 
depoliticisation and securitisation.  
Unsustainability coupled with phony stability and 
continued but fragile economic growth were 
believed to offer the basis for a solid future for the 
southern and eastern Mediterranean countries 
(SEMCs),1 as no credible prospects for radical 
democratic political change were foreseen. On the 
contrary, a deterioration of political freedoms and 
the rule of law has been the norm in the region 
rather than the exception. Despite this trend, 
economic growth had continued at an average rate 
of 4% (up till 2010) but below full potential 
hampered by inefficiency and low productivity, 
inadequate institutional capacity, market 
fragmentation and lack of integration, below-
potential foreign direct investments2 and driven by 
the consumption of scarce resources which is 
largely unsustainable.  
If these conditions had continued3 – assuming 
persistence of past trends of autocratic regimes 
(which produced fragile stability), excessive 
dependence on hydrocarbon revenues in some 
countries, a moderate investment in infrastructure 
(estimated at $1,383 billion over 2015-30),4 some 
degree of trade opening and institutional 
improvement – the SEMCs would have slowly 
grown at an annual speed of 4%. Such a 
cumulative growth rate would have translated into 
an increase of GDP of the region from $1,610 
billion in 2010 to $3,564 billion in 2030, but 
resulted in a wider gap between the North and the 
South.  
This increase will also mean a mere 3% of global 
GDP in 2030 (up from 2.7% in 2010) for the 
region, with the major part of the wealth creation 
originating from Turkey and Israel (see Tables 1a 
and 1b).  
                                                   
1 SEMCs: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. 
2 The total cumulative FDI attracted by the region accounted 
for $385 billion for 2000-11, of which $131 billion came from 
the EU and 55% was directed to Turkey.  
3 For more details on the assumptions, see Annex 1.  
4 See Paroussos et al. (2013). 
Table 1a. GDP growth in the BAU scenario in 2030  
Region*   
GDP Population GDP per capita 
$ bn % of World Annual growth rate 
Annual 
growth rate US $ 2010 
2010 2030 2010 2030 2010-30 2010-30 2010 2030 
SEMCs 1,610 3,564 2.7 3.0 4.1 1.3 5,741 9,861 
Rest of the 
Arab world  1,349 3,053 2.2 2.6 4.2 1.2 11,192 19,799 
EU27  17,462 23,695 28.8 20.2 1.5 0.2 34,893 45,529 
Emerging 
Asian 
economies  
8,840 34,572 14.6 29.5 7.1 0.8 2,855 9,541 
World  60,556 117,072 100 100 3.4 1.0 8,951 14,106 
Table 1b. Macroeconomic aggregates in BAU scenario 
in 2030 ($ billion) 
 GDP Investment 
Public 
consumption 
Private 
consumption Exports Imports 
SEMCs 3,530 768 687 2,110 816 851 
Rest of Arab 
world 3,023 654 506 1,677 1,213 1,027 
EU27 23,125 5,088 4,924 13,831 5,090 5,808 
Emerging 
Asian 
Economies 
34,290 7,488 6,169 19,747 5,807 4,921 
World 115,725 25,014 20,915 70,517 0 0 
Notes: SEMCs: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, 
Tunisia and Turkey. 
Rest of the Arab world: Armenia, Bahrain, Iran Islamic Republic, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Iraq. 
Emerging Asian economies: China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and India. 
EU27: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United 
Kingdom. 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO – in Paroussos et al. (2013). 
Amidst the global financial/economic crisis, with 
the Arab revolts that have swept across the region 
in 2011, however, the future has suddenly become 
uncertain as radical domestic political and socio-
economic changes threaten to drive the region into 
a transition period with its risks and opportunities.  
External actors – notably the EU, which has a role 
to play as the key economic partner of the region – 
are expected to rethink their policies towards the 
region as past political choices proved to be 
suboptimal to steer the region into a sustainable 
future. Past policies would lead to a widening of 
the economic gap between the South and the 
North, which over time will heighten the tensions 
between both regions. 
A growth path under the BAU scenario will 
therefore be hampered as a result of changing past 
political conditions and most notably the inherent 
instabilities of the transition period that naturally 
leads to new political and economic risks but also 
to new opportunities that may materialise if the 
best political choices are taken to drive the region 
towards sustainable futures.  
While the BAU scenario and its potential 
implications have clearly been eliminated as past 
conditions have changed radically, other scenarios 
may materialise in a 2030 perspective, depending 
on the interaction of relevant political and socio-
economic drivers that could plausibly lead to one 
or another possible future, depending on the nature 
and the scope of the policy actions to be taken (see 
Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Alternative scenarios of Euro-Mediterranean policy in 2030  
 
Source: Ayadi & Sessa (2011). 
 
Indeed, in a highly fragile and uncertain political 
and socio-economic context of pre- and post-Arab 
revolts, a scenario analysis appears to offer the best 
strategic tool for laying the basis with which to 
steer adequate policy reforms towards more long-
term and sustainable socio-economic futures. 
Alternative scenarios were derived from a 
comprehensive political and socio-economic 
reflection on what determines the wealth of nations 
and sustainability on the one hand and the 
cooperating role of the European Union as a 
leading historical, geographical, political and 
economic partner of the southern and eastern 
Mediterranean region on the other hand. 
However for synergies to emerge between drivers 
of sustainable growth and cooperation with the EU 
and to maximise the potential for the region, 
investment needs to be made in infrastructure (e.g. 
electricity, telecommunications, transport, 
water/sanitation) and human capital and market 
integration. Efforts also need to be made to foster 
stability, better governance, institutional reforms 
and increased labour force participation. These 
improvements, in turn, will result in increased 
productivity, competitiveness and employment, 
promoting economic growth and development of 
the SEMCs and the whole Euro-Mediterranean 
area.  
These scenarios were hence identified, tested, 
adapted by senior MEDPRO researchers in Ayadi 
& Sessa (2011) and finally simulated and assessed 
in Paroussos et al. (2013), using a state-of-the-art 
computable general equilibrium model derived 
from the standard GEM-E3 model and extended 
for the Mediterranean region: the so-called ‘GEM-
E3-MEDPRO’ model.5 
Scenarios for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation 
and socio-economic implications  
Let us start with the most pessimistic scenario, 
expressed simply as the ‘Euro-Mediterranean area 
under threat’, in which the Mediterranean Sea 
                                                   
5 GEM-E3-MEDPRO is a state-of-the-art economic model 
built for the MEDPRO project. It is based on a new detailed 
database for the SEMCs that goes beyond GTAP. The model 
covers multiple sectors and is global, extended to 19 
countries/regions, including the SEMCs, the EU and the rest 
of world (all linked through endogenous bilateral trade), 23 
economic sectors of activity, fully detailed social accounting 
matrices, detailed bilateral trade modelling, dynamic, 
investment-driven, general equilibrium projections up to 2030. 
The quantification of the alternative scenarios is based on 
specific assumptions on population and labour force, 
investments in infrastructure and human capital, governance 
and risk and trade liberalisation in the SEMCs. These 
assumptions are detailed in Annex 1 of this paper. For more 
details on the comprehensive assessment of the MEDPRO 
qualitative scenarios, see Paroussos et al. (2013). 
4 | AYADI & SESSA 
 
becomes a dividing line between conflicting 
civilisations. Sporadic conflicts would become 
long-lasting and would spread from one country to 
another, leading to deeper political uncertainties 
and mounting economic and social difficulties and 
tensions.  
That would translate into a significant destruction 
of economic value (a minimum of $5,239 billion, 
equivalent to a 12.7% cumulative loss of GDP over 
the period 2015-30, as compared to the BAU 
scenario) and a drastic decrease of trade 
opportunities ($2,074 billion and $1,375 billion, 
equivalent to more than 20% and 13% in exports 
and imports respectively), a loss of domestic and 
foreign investment ($1,223 billion, equivalent to 
more than 13%) as a result of increased business 
uncertainty and financial instability and a loss of 
private consumption ($3,317 billion, equivalent to 
13.4%) (see Table 2).6 
Table 2. Economic cost of the ‘Euro-Med under threat’ 
scenario in 2030* 
In bnUS$ 
(%) GDP Investment 
Private 
consumption Exports Imports Employment Real wages 
SEMCs -5,239 (-12.7) 
-1,223 
(-13.4) 
-3,317 
(-13.3) 
-2,074 
(-20.8) 
-1375 
(-13.1) (-1.5) (-12.9) 
Rest of Arab 
world  
-1 
(0) 
0 
(-0.01) 
-23 
(-0.13) 
2 
(0.01) 
-21 
(-0.17) (-0.01) (-0.11) 
EU27  -21 (-0.01) 
-35 
(-0.05) 
-398 
(-0.21) 
42 
(0.06) 
-370 
(-0.47) (0.02) (-0.12) 
Emerging 
Asian 
economies  
115 
(0.03) 
0 
(0) 
-155 
(-0.08) 
235 
(0.37) 
-35 
(-0.06) (0.01) (-0.03) 
World  -5,010 (-0.35) 
-1,271 
(-0.4) 
-4,323 
(-0.51) - - (-0.03) (-0.36) 
* Changes from the BAU scenario cumulatively over 2015-30. 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO – in Paroussos et al. (2013). 
 
However, the speed and extent of economic loss 
cannot be predicted and therefore these results are 
only an illustration of the potential (rather mild) 
consequences if the ‘Euro-Mediterranean area 
under threat’ scenario were to materialise. 
These new conditions therefore will further widen 
the gap between North and South and result in 
protracted national and regional social tensions and 
potentially high loss of employment that would 
progressively lead to waves of illegal migration 
and heightened political and social tensions with 
neighbouring countries.  
The failure to resolve the conflicts in the Middle 
East and the Western Sahara and the emergence of 
new conflicts would exacerbate tensions in the 
Mashreq and the Maghreb, which would lead to 
contagion and heightened political risks. These 
uncertainties and tensions would offer new 
opportunities for terrorist/organised crime 
organisations and radical movements to ultimately 
take power.  
                                                   
6 For more details on the assumptions under the quantification 
of this scenario, see Annex 1. 
The absence of cooperating authorities in the 
SEMCs would undermine the EU’s and other 
geopolitical actors’ capacities to achieve the 
necessary cooperation on key sectors, such as 
migration, research, science and technology and 
education, agriculture, environment, security and 
energy.  
As a result, in 2030, the Mediterranean would 
become a border zone of broad conflicts, which, if 
not contained, would spread to the northern 
frontiers. This is indicated in the diagram above as 
the ‘red’ transition towards a widening gap and 
increasing tensions and conflicts between the two 
shores of the Mediterranean.  
The consequences of this scenario must not be 
underestimated for they would plague the Euro-
Mediterranean region for generations to come.  
According to Tocci (2011), the signals emitted in 
the pre- and post-Arab uprisings appear to point to 
further polarization and heterogeneity of the 
Mediterranean. Countries have been reeling from 
sporadic open conflicts (e.g. Libya, Israel, 
Palestine and Syria) to political and economic 
uncertainty (e.g. Egypt and Tunisia) and wait and 
see strategy (e.g. Algeria). With no clear target or 
direction, they alternate between pressures and 
tensions to continued un-sustainability and hopes 
for achieving sustainability, while trying to cope 
with new realities and dynamics brought about by 
changing political grounds.  
A “no-action policy” would progressively lead the 
region to a gloomy future towards a red transition.  
The prospects do not give grounds for optimism. 
Between mounting conflicts pressures, the failure 
to anchor democratic values in the several political 
transitions underway, the quick deterioration of the 
socio-economic conditions, the lack of socio-
economic reforms, the progressive multiplication 
of extremist/jihadist religious factions and armed 
movements, the increasing political risks and the 
subsequent decrease of investments and economic 
activity and lack of vision and decisive action from 
the EU and other geopolitical actors, the region is 
heading towards a disastrous “red transition” 
quicker than one might expect.  
One can envisage two alternative scenarios of 
long-term growth and sustainability if the 
necessary political and economic can be 
summoned, but with each following a different 
path of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation/ 
partnership. Within the optimistic vision for the 
region, the Arab revolts can be taken as a starting 
point towards one or possibly both of these 
sustainable paths.  
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In a perspective of a ‘Euro-Mediterranean Union’, 
recognising their shared past, believing in their 
common future and building on their 
complementarities, the European and the South 
(and East) Mediterranean countries would 
eventually form an integrated region with a 
common market.  
The integration scheme could be inspired by the 
European Economic Area (EEA) model – to 
develop an adapted Euro-Med Economic Area 
(EMEA) establishing deep and comprehensive 
socio-economic relations, based on full movement 
of goods, capital and people and hence aimed at 
full participation of the SEMCs in the EU’s 
Internal Market. This path would result in the 
adoption of the EU acquis, the full participation in 
the programmes and agencies and the mobilisation 
of the necessary foreign direct investment and 
adequate financial means (e.g. structural/ guarantee 
funds, etc.). It would thus lead to more 
convergence and ultimately to consolidating 
development and furthering the economic 
integration.  
Since not all of the countries have reached the 
same level of political and socio-economic 
development and depth of relationship with the 
EU, the differentiated approach as outlined in its 
response to the Arab spring, the so-called ‘renewed 
neighbourhood policy’ might result in a number of 
countries progressing more quickly than others to 
fulfil the requirements to become part of the new 
Euro-Mediterranean economic bloc.  
At a later stage, this renewed neighbourhood 
policy would need to be fundamentally reoriented 
towards the philosophy of the Euro-Med economic 
model that would give a stake in the EU Internal 
Market while providing full technical and financial 
support to the SEMCs to adopt the EU acquis. The 
Union for the Mediterranean, the Arab League and 
others could play an important role in fostering and 
speeding regional cooperation (and convergence) 
beyond the Euro-Mediterranean geography and 
framework, thus deepening the economic 
integration between all countries of the region 
(including the Gulf States, other Arab states and 
Africa).7 However, if not fundamentally 
restructured to be enlarged to other regions, the 
importance of the UfM may diminish over time 
when all SEMC would have a stake in the EU 
single market.  
                                                   
7 Both institutions can become the drivers of Euro-
Mediterranean and Euro-Arab regional integration and beyond 
if they have adequate resources to achieve this objective.   
Under such a scenario, the tensions of post-Arab 
uprisings and conflicts in the Euro-Mediterranean 
region would be settled, economic growth and 
development would be enhanced accordingly with 
a cumulative GDP increase beyond BAU scenario 
of up to $2,896 billion which is equivalent to 7% 
increase necessary to start closing the gap between 
the North and the South between 2015 and 2030.  
This cumulative economic value is made possible 
if an additional investment in infrastructure for the 
same period would amount to up to 1066 bn$ 
beyond the business as usual trend (which is 
estimated at $1,383 billion) (Table 3).  
Table 3. Economic benefits of the Euro-Med Union 
Scenario in 2030* 
In bnUS$ 
(%) GDP Investment 
Private 
Consumption Exports Imports Employment 
Real 
Wages 
Investment 
in infra 
SEMCs 2,896 997 848 1,414 2,896 (2.02) (4.78) 1066 (7.03) (10.94) (11.19) (5.65) (7.03) 
Rest of 
Arab world  
-7 0 0 2 -7 (-0.04) (-0.11)  (-0.02) (0) (0) (0.01) (-0.02)  
EU27  1,321 242 0 775 1,321 (0.59) (-0.62)  (0.42) (0.35) (0) (0.42) (0.42)  
Emerging 
Asian 
Economies  
-48 -1 0 -20 -48 
(0) (-0.02) 
 
(-0.01) (0) (0) (-0.01) (-0.01)  
World  4,131 1,230 848 2,128 4,131 (0.09) (0.01)  (0.29) (0.39) (0.34) (0.25) (0.29)  
* Changes from the BAU scenario cumulatively over 2015-2030. 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO – in Paroussos et al. (2013). 
 
However, not all countries in the South and East 
Mediterranean region will benefit from the same 
level of cumulative economic growth (and hence 
the GDP per capita) under this scenario because of 
different socio-economic links with the EU from 
the start and also the potential for further 
development. During the projected period the 
Maghreb countries (e.g. Algeria, Libya, Morocco 
and Tunisia) will maximise the growth potential as 
compared to the rest of the countries and Palestine 
will see its economy improving mainly because of 
the conflict resolution (Table 4). 
Table 4. GDP per capita changes in the Euro-Med 
Union/Alliance Scenarios in the SEMCs in 
2030* 
 Euro-Mediterranean Union Scenario Euro-Mediterranean Alliance Scenario 
Israel 2.54 3.57 
Turkey 6.38 3.42 
Algeria 27.26 14.40 
Egypt 14.65 10.94 
Morocco 12.82 7.96 
Tunisia 18.32 11.03 
Libya 24.60 19.69 
Lebanon 13.52 10.87 
Syria 7.79 6.26 
Jordan 10.98 10.79 
Palestine 21.18 16.51 
* Changes from the BAU scenario cumulatively over 2015-2030. 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO – in Paroussos et al (2013). 
 
From a sectoral point of view, production would 
increase mainly in the sectors producing the 
investment goods and the services for upgrading 
infrastructure and in sectors that are favoured by 
trade liberalisation. Sectors such as equipment and 
basic manufacturing goods, as well as in 
construction and services will benefit the most 
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from this scenario. The textile sector would benefit 
from trade liberalisation. (Table 5).  
Table 5. Economic benefits per sector of Euro-Med 
Union and Euro-Med Alliance Scenarios for the 
SEMCs in 2030*  
 Euro-Med Union Scenario Euro-Med Alliance Scenario 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 131 3.02 541 12.46 
Energy 409 1.96 -13 -0.06 
Chemical products 568 17.42 881 27.01 
Other energy-intensive 565 8.99 -136 -2.16 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 413 8.89 -248 -5.34 
Transport equipment 180 9.12 -37 -1.89 
Consumer goods industries – Food 293 5.72 258 5.04 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 52 6.93 8 1.06 
Textiles and clothing 1,165 28.48 731 17.86 
Construction 1,112 15.42 745 10.34 
Transport 182 2.74 -14 -0.21 
Communication 173 11.21 122 7.87 
Services 1,201 3.86 738 2.37 
* Cumulative change of output by economic sector between 2015-2030 from BAU scenario. 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO – in Paroussos et al. (2013). 
Finally, the creation of a larger and powerful Euro-
Mediterranean community could influence the 
global scenario for the year 2030, with the 
emergence of a tri-polar world, dominated by the 
US, China and Euro-Med.8  
This prospect is indicated in the diagram above as 
the ‘green’ transition, because it entails the 
expansion of the ‘Green-Growth’ strategies that 
currently underpin most of the EU’s policies on 
energy, environment, research, development and 
technology and other key sectors to include the 
South and East Mediterranean.  
In practice, however, this scenario would still 
reflect a Euro-centric vision of the future.  
Another scenario that is worth considering – 
referred to as the ‘Euro-Mediterranean Alliance(s)’ 
– would keep the North and the South/East 
separate: the EU on the North (which may or may 
not be enlarged to include the Balkan States and 
potentially Turkey) and the Southern 
Mediterranean countries on the South/East (which 
may or may not include other African and Middle 
Eastern countries). Under such a scenario, there 
would be no perspective (or need) for pursuing an 
integration model such as the Euro-Med Economic 
Area. 
On the contrary, most indications point to an 
increasingly heterogeneous region, where distinct 
but related countries and sub-regions (e.g. Western 
Mediterranean, South Mediterranean, Eastern 
Mediterranean, Maghreb, Mashrek…) would work 
in association towards the same aim of 
sustainability within an increasingly 
interdependent world. Bilateral EU policies, such 
as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
                                                   
8 Such an assumption is consolidated over time with a 
continuing enlargement of the EU towards the East. At the 
time of writing of this paper, Croatia has formally become the 
28th member of the EU. 
would shed their ‘enlargement-like’ approach, 
while multilateral policies, such as the UfM, would 
need to be revised and enhanced to account for a 
more heterogeneous Mediterranean and increasing 
economic partnership with other regions such as 
the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council and 
others. The region would also feature its own 
forms of multilateral cooperation (e.g. the Arab 
League, the Arab Maghreb Union, etc.). The 
North, the East and South would enter into 
cooperative contractual relations, featuring trade 
and co-development, political dialogue, security, as 
well as specific initiatives pertaining to youth 
education and employment opportunities, circular 
migration schemes, research, science, technology, 
innovation and infrastructure (energy, transport 
and ICT), agriculture, food and water security, and 
mitigation and adaptation to climate change. 
In this scenario of differentiated multilateralism, 
regional cooperation schemes would be applied in 
a more selective way with regard to participating 
actors and subject areas, fully recognising that 
Western, South and Eastern Mediterranean and 
other sub regions are distinct geographical sub-
regions (even if there may be some overlap) each 
with its own specific problems, opportunities and 
challenges. 
Given its inherent heterogeneity, in all likelihood, 
this scenario would not entail a full Arab-Israeli 
cooperation in a common economic area (as 
membership in a Euro-Med Economic-like area 
would entail in the “Euro-Mediterranean Union” 
vision), but at least will require the progressive 
neutralisation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
latter could be ensured by the admission of both 
Turkey and Israel in an enlarged EU or European 
Economic Area – EEA – facilitated by these two 
countries being the wealthiest amongst the SEMCs 
– and the concomitant requirement for Israel and 
Turkey to accept the ‘two-state’ solution and 
maintain peaceful relationships among them, with 
the Palestinian Authority and with the other 
neighbourhoods. Also the Western Sahara conflict 
could be neutralised by Algeria and Morocco 
entering in a regional cooperation scheme (e.g. the 
Arab Maghreb Union). Under such a scenario, the 
political transitions in a post-Arab revolt era will 
be settled and the necessary economic reforms 
launched. 
Under this scenario, there would be economic 
growth beyond the BAU scenario of about $1,905 
billion above reference which corresponds to a 
cumulative growth of 4.62% during the period 
2015-2030 (Table 6). Such an additional economic 
value can be achieved with an investment in 
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infrastructure of an additional $700 billion beyond 
the BAU scenario.9 
Table 6. Economic benefits of the Euro-Med Alliance 
scenario in 2030* 
In bnUS$ 
(%) GDP Investment 
Private 
Consumption Exports Imports Employment 
Real 
Wages 
SEMC  1,905 675 555 1,527 1,425 (1.35) (7.15) (4.62) (7.41) (7.32) (6.1) (14.27) 
Rest of Arab 
World  
115 16 0 99 159 (1.22) (-1.9) (0.32) (0.2) (0) (0.54) (1.07) 
EU27  -119 -24 0 -322 -94 (0) (-0.13) (-0.04) (-0.03) (0) (-0.17) (-0.13) 
Emerging 
Asian 
Economies  
356 26 0 125 1,072 
(0) (0.07) 
(0.1) (0.03) (0) (0.06) (1.69) 
World  2,350 662 555 1,177  (0.07) (0.07) (0.17) (0.21) (0.22) (0.14)  
* Changes from the BAU scenario cumulatively over 2015-2030. 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO – in Paroussos et al. (2013). 
 
As in the Euro-Mediterranean Union scenario, 
under the Alliance scenario, not all countries in the 
southern and eastern Mediterranean region would 
benefit from the same level of cumulative 
economic growth (and hence the GDP per capita 
increase) because of their initial economic 
structures and competitive advantages. In addition, 
under this scenario, all countries in the region 
would be competing world-wide and against each 
other and hence will suffer from their 
vulnerabilities. As with the previous scenario, the 
Maghreb countries would benefit more during the 
projected period compared to the rest of the 
countries, and Palestine would see its economy 
improving mainly because of improving political 
conditions (Table 4).  
From a sectoral point of view, sectors such as 
equipment and basic manufacturing goods, as well 
as in construction and services would benefit the 
most from this scenario. In contrast, equipment 
goods and some of the consumer goods industry 
would suffer from increasing competition world-
wide (Table 5).  
Also this vision, as with the previous “Euro-
Mediterranean Union” scenario, is coherent with a 
multi-polar world envisaged for the year 2030, but 
the European Union and the southern and eastern 
Mediterranean will play separate roles on the 
global stage, maintaining preferential relationships 
of co-development in some key areas of common 
interest.  
This perspective is indicated in the diagram as the 
‘blue’ transition, because it is based on common 
policies built with the active contribution of 
people, civil society and policy-makers on all sides 
of the Mediterranean, without the emergence of a 
dominant partner (the process is symbolically 
centred in the ‘blue’ Mediterranean Sea). 
                                                   
9 See Paroussos et al. (2013). 
Overall, both scenarios will lead to increasing 
growth and welfare10 in the region (Table 7). 
Lower unemployment rates and higher wages 
induced mainly by projects to upgrade the 
infrastructure would lead to an increase in 
household income.  
Table 7. Welfare under the Euro-Med Union and 
Alliance scenario in 2030 
 Euro-Mediterranean Union Scenario Euro-Mediterranean Alliance Scenario 
 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Israel 0.19 0.61 0.99 1.41 0.19 1.05 2.08 3.64 
Turkey -0.02 3.89 8.74 15.73 0.73 6.07 11.64 18.87 
Algeria 1.76 4.45 7.55 11.42 0.70 2.21 3.81 5.83 
Egypt 0.76 3.21 5.71 9.07 0.75 3.29 5.95 9.55 
Morocco 0.89 2.12 3.19 4.54 0.47 1.43 2.19 3.25 
Tunisia 0.71 2.57 3.91 5.73 0.28 1.34 2.17 3.46 
Libya -0.26 1.43 3.09 5.02 -0.18 1.39 2.63 4.01 
Lebanon 0.29 0.97 1.50 2.11 0.23 0.77 1.25 1.90 
Syria 0.32 0.84 1.35 2.02 0.20 0.73 1.21 1.83 
Jordan 0.22 0.75 1.09 1.48 0.45 1.69 2.19 2.74 
Palestine 1.29 0.91 1.04 1.27 0.77 0.90 1.06 1.27 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO – in Paroussos et al. (2013). 
 
The Euro-Mediterranean Union and Alliance 
scenarios are not mutually exclusive. Over time, 
elements of both scenarios can complement each 
other to maximise the potential economic value in 
the region to reach what can be described as a 
‘Nirvana scenario’.  
The EU policy response: State of the art 
According to the assessment of more than four 
decades of Euro-Mediterranean partnership by 
Ayadi and Gadi (2013) before the Arab uprisings, 
the EU has failed to drive the SEM region towards 
a sustainable future as a result of the 
fragmentation, discontinuity and failure to enforce 
its policies, the absence of clear incentives towards 
more integration of the Euro-Mediterranean region, 
the lack of coordination between the EU and the 
individual member states on key dimensions of the 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the poor 
performance of the financial assistance framework 
applied in the region.  
Caught off guard by the Arab revolts, the EU has 
been now engaged for some time now in a major 
mid-term review of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP). When the revolts broke out, the 
European Commission acknowledged the need to 
revise the ENP so as to pay greater attention to 
political reforms, while being ready to commit to 
deepened political and economic relations with the 
neighbouring countries. As suggested by Tocci 
(2011), the drivers of this choice were underpinned 
in the bureaucratic rationale that has pressed EU 
institutions to proceed, full speed, with a review of 
the ENP, in the internal political-institutional 
rationale that has induced the European 
Commission to ‘use’ the Arab revolts to reassert 
itself at the centre of the EU’s Mediterranean 
                                                   
10 As measured by Hicksian equivalent variation.  
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policies and finally in the external political 
rationale that has induced a focus on the ENP, 
which demonstrated its weakness notably through 
its lopsided emphasis on economic cooperation and 
migration management at the expense of 
sustainable development. 
The EU’s stance as reflected in the Commission’s 
Communication on “Partnership for Democracy 
and Shared Prosperity” issued in March 2011, and 
complemented soon thereafter by “A New 
Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” issued in 
May 2011, has been therefore timid and with no 
major change in vision foreseen in the state of 
affairs in the region.  
The EU recognised the need to deepen the 
Partnership with its neighbours who are committed 
to democracy, human rights, social justice, good 
governance and the rule of law, while reaffirming 
the differentiated and conditional approach (“more 
for more”).  
To support the political transition, the EU 
committed additional funding11 for more targeted 
support in developing and sustaining political 
parties (through the Endowment for Democracy) 
and civil society (through the Civil Society 
Facility).   
To contribute to a sustainable and economic 
development in the region, the EU embarked on 
negotiations for deepening its bilateral relations 
with most of the SEMCs. The so-called Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) 
are expected to open the door to more access to the 
EU’s single market. Efforts are also being made to 
support micro, small and medium-sized enterprises 
(MSMEs), vocational and educational training; 
improve health and education systems; develop 
poorer regions and enhance sectoral cooperation. 
Moreover, the EU has promised more ‘mobility 
partnerships’, which are designed to better manage 
migration flows between the EU and SEMCs, and 
in particular to fight illegal migration, in exchange 
for enhanced possibilities of mobility between 
SEMCs and the EU for their citizens.  
To further promote regional integration, the EU 
recognised the need for the various regional 
organisations and structures that already exist to be 
re-energised in order to meet common challenges. 
This approach is being implemented already with 
the Maghreb countries (e.g. Joint Communication 
supporting closer cooperation and regional 
                                                   
11 Ayadi & Gadi (2013) for more detail on the evolution and 
an assessment of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and 
financial assistance.  
integration in the Maghreb), and with the grouping 
of five countries of the EU southern Mediterranean 
and of the Maghreb (the so-called “5+5”) currently 
establishing cooperation activities on the basis of 
shared interests and common objectives. The role 
of the UfM has been also slowly activated to 
develop its initial projects to bridge both shores of 
the Mediterranean.  
These commitments are to be welcomed, but they 
remain trapped in a BAU scenario based on the 
same paradigm underpinning the differentiation 
and the conditional approach of the EU, 
supplemented by a collection of actions with no 
coherent vision. As emphasised by Tocci (2011), 
this logic is no more than the one of enlargement, 
security, vagueness, insularity and bilateral 
relationships with the countries of the region.  
Transitions and policy agendas towards 
sustainable futures  
Looking ahead to the 2030 horizon, the EU’s 
response to the challenges in the region appear still 
do not reflect a vision towards either the ‘green’ or 
the ‘blue’ transition. Instead, it remains trapped in 
the BAU scenario while the region is moving 
towards further polarisation and increased 
instability and social tension, which might drive 
the region towards the red transition.  
Re-defining a comprehensive new agenda for long-
term sustainable economic growth for the region 
becomes a priority if not a necessity.  
The new agenda will build on the synergies 
between drivers of sustainable growth and 
cooperation between the SEMCs and the EU to 
maximise the potential of long-term growth and 
development, looking beyond: i) the BAU scenario 
which has failed to build upon the Euro- 
Mediterranean socio-economic complementarities, 
and ii) the uncertainties currently brought about by 
the break-up of the social contracts in the SEMCs 
by the post-Arab uprisings and the potential failure 
to anchor democracy. 
To provide the grounds for such a new Euro-
Mediterranean cooperation agenda, the MEDPRO 
forward-looking exercise has analysed the 
demographic/human, economic, financial, energy 
and environment implications of the different red, 
blue and green transitions for the SEMCs. This in-
depth analysis has pointed to the long-term policy 
implications and recommendations to orient the 
SEMCs’ and the EU’s policy response towards a 
sustainable Euro-Mediterranean in 2030.  
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Demographics, human capital and migration 
Looking forward to the expected demographic 
dividend in the SEMCs, Groenewold et al. (2013) 
show that as a result of the increase in population, 
the region will either experience increases in 
numbers and relative size of working-age 
populations, or it will experience a stabilisation of 
already-high numbers and shares. Thus, the 
window-of-opportunity to the demographic 
dividend is opening now or is already open to 
SEMCs.12 Only a limited time frame is available to 
benefit from this dividend, however, as the 
window-of-opportunity starts closing around 2035.  
Moreover, although a demographic dividend is an 
opportunity to push economic growth upwards, it 
is not a sufficient condition. Employment creation 
has been below expectations in the region, in 
particular for the growing share of educated youth. 
Unemployment rates have been at the two-digits 
level and are on the rise. In the absence of 
meaningful socio-economic reforms, the 
demographic dividend will turn into a penalty in 
the years to come.  
Labour migration, frequently a safety-valve in the 
past for excess (unemployed) population, will 
become more difficult. Many receiving countries 
among the EU member states, despite expected 
labour force shortages resulting from declining 
active populations, are increasingly unreceptive to 
immigrants who do not have vocational skills to 
properly integrate into the labour market. The 
socio-cultural environment of these receiving 
countries also discourages immigration. According 
to Carrera et al. (2012), there seems to be no 
change in the EU policy framework on migration 
towards the SEMCs. The so-called EU Dialogues 
for Migration, Mobility and Security for the 
Southern Mediterranean remain rooted in an 
insecurity-oriented understanding of human 
mobility. This approach underestimates the links 
between human capital, migration, employment 
and economic development.  
                                                   
12 The total population of the SEMCs will increase from about 
280 million (in 2010) to a figure between 395 million (the 
stress scenario) and 426 million (the alliance scenario) during 
the period 2045-2050. EU27 country populations are expected 
to grow from about 500 to 525 million people in that same 
period. Population growth is predominantly determined by 
growth in the largest two countries, Egypt and Turkey. There, 
in 2010, 81.1 and 72.8 million people lived, respectively, 
comprising about 55% of the population in the SMC region. 
Expected population growth in Egypt is the highest in the 
region. Depending on the scenario, Egypt’s population will 
increase between 2010 and 2050 with a figure between 44 and 
53 million persons.  
As far as human capital development is concerned, 
Ayadi and El Mahdi (2013) showed that despite 
the substantial progress in school enrolment and 
narrowing the gender gap and higher government 
spending on education in recent decades, the 
increase in educational attainment has not 
translated into equally higher participation rates in 
the labour market, particularly for women. This is 
partly attributed to the low quality of their 
education, low returns on education and persistent 
skills mismatch in the job market.  
The whole demographic dividend and 
employability require a fundamental change in 
approach towards designing new human capital 
development strategies and considering migration 
as an opportunity for socio-economic development, 
in particular for the recipient countries.  
Therefore policy-makers in both SEMCs and the 
EU need to give this challenge their immediate 
attention. This can be done by convening and 
developing commonly agreed strategies and 
programmes to enhance human capital, promote 
higher education standards and better prepare 
youth and young adults, and women, for the human 
skills and quality demands of labour markets in 
SEMCs and EU countries. Diplomas, certification 
recognition, exchange of best practices and 
multiplication of partnerships between educative 
institutions and with the private sector are 
cornerstones towards building a Euro-
Mediterranean human capital space.   
Obviously, such programmes should prepare 
prospective migrants for a life in EU countries in 
terms of their socio-cultural integration.  
The future needs for skilled labour in EU countries 
require EU and SEMC policy-makers to modernise 
EU migration policies to encompass new 
admission rules and regulations, and labour 
migration programmes that better manage the flow 
of (skilled) labour migration from SEMCs to the 
EU and back to the home countries. 
These and other issues should be framed and 
agreed upon between the EU and its neighbouring 
countries in the context of a Euro-Mediterranean 
Strategy for Human Capital Development and 
Mobility. 
Socio-economic and financial development 
To drive the SEMCs towards a sustainable growth 
and development path, some policy decisions in 
the socio-economic and financial fields have to be 
taken.  
Undoubtedly, undertaking timely socio-economic 
reforms in a political transition phase post-Arab 
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uprisings might be a delicate task, but a step-by-
step, long-term approach is necessary to drive the 
region towards sustainable growth paths that 
generate employment and deal with inequality and 
social exclusion.  
In line with the proposals of Dabrowski and De 
Wulf (2013), the SEMCs should pursue a prudent 
fiscal policy to maintain a fiscal balance, develop 
the business and investment environment to 
develop the private sector (with a particular focus 
on sectors of key importance in the region such as 
tourism, agriculture, textiles and new high growth 
sectors) and to attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI) particularly in infrastructure and other 
sectors that are essential for economic 
development and job creation. At the same time, as 
was outlined in Ayadi and El Mahdi (2013), social 
and income redistribution policies must go along 
with economic policies and be well designed and 
well targeted in order to overcome social 
disparities and raising inequalities. 
Trade will continue to play a critical role in the 
growth and development path of the region in the 
next decades. Deepening intra-SEMC trade, with 
the EU and other economic partners, is thus 
essential. Measures that would further boost 
openness include tariffs removal, the progressive 
reduction of trade-restricting non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) after a thorough cost-benefit analysis, 
decreasing high transport costs and improving 
uncompetitive trade logistics. However, deepening 
integration with large economic partners must take 
into account potential vulnerabilities due to loss of 
competitiveness which might lead to unintended 
economic losses.  
Investment in infrastructure should aim to achieve 
levels beyond the Business as Usual scenario in all 
sectors such as transport, water sanitation, energy, 
human capital and telecoms. With more 
infrastructure development, other economic sectors 
will thrive and contribute to sustainable 
development in the region. Important economic 
sectors such as agriculture, tourism, manufacturing 
and services must be further developed along the 
value chain. New high growth and employment 
potential sectors in industry and services, and in 
which the EU and other external actors have 
potential interest to grow should be identified 
and/or further developed in line with the Euro-Med 
Union and Alliance scenarios. The southern and 
eastern Mediterranean region can develop into a 
second natural production field, service provider 
and market for the EU in sectors where 
complementarities can be sought.  
Another key area where a sustained effort of 
reform in the region is needed is financial markets. 
The bottom line is how to ensure that finance is at 
the service of long-term growth. However, as was 
argued in Ayadi (2013), the financial sector in the 
region is not only lagging behind as compared to 
other developing regions but it also does not seem 
to contribute to long-term growth. The challenge 
ahead is how to bring a positive significance to the 
finance-growth relationship in the region. 
Indeed, as amply demonstrated in other regions, 
notably the EU, financial integration is a growth 
enhancer. The SEMCs lag behind in terms of 
financial integration. A long-term agenda for far-
reaching regulatory harmonisation in the financial 
market is needed to start the process. Such an 
agenda should concentrate on diminishing the 
unproductive influence of the public sector on the 
financial sector, ensuring full independence of 
central banks and harmonising the regulations and 
infrastructure in financial services and capital 
markets to promote access to efficient, competitive 
and safe financial services to companies, investors 
and individuals. The future policy should promote 
competition, efficiency, financial inclusion and 
financial stability simultaneously.   
To benefit from the positive impacts of financial 
reform and hence of financial development, it is 
essential to ensure that key prerequisites are met. 
Strengthening legal institutions and democratic 
governance and implementing and enforcing these 
financial reforms within a fully stable macro-
economic framework, where inflation is contained, 
capital account gradually opened and investment 
and trade fostered are the key conditions for a 
significant relationship to form between financial 
development and growth. Beyond that, targeted 
actions must be taken to enhance access to finance 
to MSMEs, which are key to job creation. For 
example, in a context of market failures, loan and 
equity guarantee schemes, if well designed, can 
play a central role in alleviating some financial 
constraints.  
Finally, aimed at furthering the Euro-
Mediterranean integration, the SEMCs and the EU 
should develop a common long-term economic and 
financial development and integration strategy. 
This strategy should be built on four pillars:  
A full economic integration agenda aimed at 
progressively removing all tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers and introducing regulatory harmonisation 
and standardisation, while ensuring a fair trade 
balance for trade partners; 
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A comprehensive initiative in infrastructure 
investment whose purpose is to close the 
infrastructure investment gap in the region;  
A Euro-Mediterranean sectoral development 
initiative to identify the complementarities and 
potential additional economic value to further 
develop existing and new sectors; and  
A Euro-Mediterranean financial market initiative 
to promote and monitor Euro-Mediterranean 
financial market integration. Such an initiative will 
bring together financial and market regulators from 
both shores of the Mediterranean to agree on a 
Euro-Mediterranean financial services action plan 
that would set the foundation for a more integrated 
Euro-Mediterranean financial market that is 
competitive, safe and inclusive and that benefits 
both the EU and the SEMCs. 
Energy and climate change mitigation  
The current energy situation in the SEMCs is 
characterised by a rapid increase of energy 
demand, low energy efficiency and low domestic 
energy prices due to extensive and universal 
consumption subsidies. The latter act as a strong 
disincentive to a rational and efficient use of 
energy and investment in the sector, including 
renewable energy.  
Large subsidies and continuing high and volatile 
global prices for energy commodities constitute a 
burden on the public finances of many net-
importing countries and their citizens.  
In short, the current energy situation does not 
appear sustainable and poses several risks to the 
prospects of socio-economic development of the 
region.  
The SEMCs are endowed with a large potential for 
renewable energy as well as significant energy 
efficiency and demand-side management (DSM). 
Thanks to the ongoing technological and 
institutional changes, all countries in the region 
could make use of this large potential. While in the 
past only the hydropower was exploited (mainly in 
Turkey, Egypt and Morocco), presently all 
countries are developing plans to enable them to 
also rely on other renewable sources, such as solar, 
wind and biomass. These sources can be developed 
for both domestic and export markets.  
For these programmes to be successful, it is 
important to implement socio-economic reforms 
backed by solid strategies, improved governance, 
regulation, rationalised energy-pricing structures 
and subsidy systems, combined energy-supply 
policies with strong energy-efficiency and DSM 
policies, shared R&D to design new technologies, 
and find new and innovative financing instruments 
to address both centralised and decentralised 
renewable energy development and energy-
efficiency measures. As was suggested in Hafner et 
al. (2013), a Euro-Mediterranean energy transition 
strategy is needed. Such a strategy should be built 
on four pillars:  
Unlocking the untapped potential for energy 
efficiency and DSM policies. An effective national 
and regional policy agenda on energy efficiency 
and DSM should consider households, SMEs and 
the building sector as priority targets. It should 
include several actors and institutions at the 
national level (and regional level) to create 
synergies. Dedicated agencies should be formed to 
implement the right technical choices – and the 
best financing tools – and to enforce mandatory 
regulations. Finally it should consider the financial 
constraints of energy efficiency and DSM, the 
timing and the hierarchy of the implementation 
measures and the relevant action plans that set 
implementation schedules and responsibilities. The 
EU can offer technical assistance in these fields. 
Unlocking the renewable energy potential. The 
development of different scale renewable energy 
projects in the SEMCs is highly recommended. It 
is important to avoid focusing solely on large-scale 
renewable energy projects, but also to firmly 
develop decentralised systems, such as solar water 
heaters and rural PV systems and to develop new 
shared technologies to maximise potential. This 
development would offer a wide variety of 
advantages, as follows. i) Renewable energy 
projects could initially be primarily devoted to 
diversifying the energy mix, still largely dominated 
by fossil fuels. This would free up natural gas 
alternatively used in the domestic power 
generation sector for additional exports to Europe. 
ii) Renewable energy projects, due to their 
intermittency (now well forecasted days ahead), 
require the reinforcement of grids to enable their 
integration into larger, interconnected electricity 
networks and markets, further fostering the 
integration of the SEMCs. iii) Part of the 
renewable electricity could also be exported to 
Europe via HVDC (high voltage direct current) 
electricity interconnections. iv) Renewable energy 
projects could develop significant new industry 
and service sectors (e.g. installers), leading to local 
job creation and manufacturing developments; v) 
the economic and industrial development 
consequent to the large-scale implementation of 
renewable energy projects in the SEMCs could 
have several positive spillovers for the EU, such as 
creating new markets and securing the existing 
energy infrastructure in the Mediterranean.  
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Developing a new structure of regional and 
interconnected markets. For renewable energy to 
contribute most effectively to the development of 
the SEMCs, it must be embedded in a functioning, 
regional electricity market that permits the 
exchange of power in substantial volumes, has no 
barriers to trade and is friendly to private 
investment. Such a market does not yet exist across 
the SEMCs. There is neither the infrastructure nor 
the regulatory and legislative framework that 
would be necessary for a regional market to 
function correctly. Indeed, electricity 
interconnection remains a key issue for energy 
cooperation in the region. It is of crucial 
importance to reinforce the national transmission 
lines in the SEMCs, which are often weak, as well 
as interconnections between these countries.  
Set-up the appropriate mechanisms to finance the 
sustainable energy transition in SEMCs: To 
finance energy efficiency and renewable energy 
development innovative financing methods are 
needed. The Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) is a potential source of additional revenue 
streams for investments in energy efficiency and 
renewable energy, and SEMCs seem to be 
endowed with significant carbon market 
opportunities. But to date the SEMCs have not 
fully tapped into the vast potential for CDM 
projects, as several barriers to the development of 
CDM projects in the region persist: 1) the lack of 
capacity for operation and management, 2) the lack 
of regional coordination and 3) the lack of 
engagement of the private sector. However, the 
Mediterranean region offers an interesting 
opportunity for an integrated approach to carbon 
markets: there is indeed an institutional set-up (e.g. 
the UfM), a financial facility (the Mediterranean 
Carbon Fund) and a region-wide initiative with 
substantial potential for energy-related emission 
reductions (the Mediterranean Solar Plan) that 
could fit into a new market-based mechanism.  
Moreover, and with regard to the need for new 
financing sources and instruments for the 
development of renewable energy projects in the 
SEMCs, the EU could also play an important role 
in facilitating investments by the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries, among others, in the 
SEMCs. Notably, a strong complementarity exists 
between these regions in the field of renewable 
energy. The wide availability of capital in the 
GCC, the great renewable energy potential of the 
SEMCs, with the possibility (considering their 
geographical proximity) to export some of it to 
Europe, and the institutional support of the EU 
could represent the three main pillars of a new 
‘triangle of growth’. Private and public investors 
(such as sovereign wealth funds) from the GCC are 
increasingly focusing their investments on the 
renewable energy sector, with the aim of 
transforming oil wealth into technological 
leadership in renewable energy. Some of the 
investment could be directed towards the SEMCs, 
whose potential for solar energy is among the 
highest in the world and which are already 
promoting several large-scale renewable energy 
projects. The EU should facilitate the 
implementation of this process by providing 
institutional support (in terms of both regulation 
and public finance) and technological know-how. 
Environment and climate change adaptation  
The Mediterranean region is one of the world's 
climate change hotspots and the heart of drastic 
socio‐economic transformation. Recent research 
confirms that temperature increases will be higher 
compared to the global average, precipitation is 
projected to decline and the probability of extreme 
drought to increase (IPCC 2007). Final 
vulnerability, however, depends also on sensitivity 
and adaptive capacity, which are highly country-
specific and differentiated particularly between the 
Northern and the Southern shores of the 
Mediterranean. Against a rather low vulnerability 
of Northern shore countries, with losses ranging 
from the -0.25% to the -1.4% of GDP for 
temperature increases above the 4°C (Ciscar et al., 
2011, Anaheim et al., 2010), stands a much higher 
vulnerability of SEMCs.  
In particular, these climatic changes will have 
adverse impacts on crop production driven by an 
increasing water scarcity which exacerbates 
ongoing processes of desertification and water 
overuse, pollution, salination in a context of 
increasing demand (IPCC, 2007; FAO, 2011). 
Another less obvious, but relevant channel of 
potential negative economic impacts in SEMCs is 
the climate-induced loss of biodiversity. In 
addition to threatening ecosystem life-support 
services, it can negatively impact tourism. 
Water resources will be also under increasing 
stress: albeit with country variability, water 
withdrawals in SEMCs are projected to increase 
and water availability to decline. Until 2030 
withdrawals would still remain below the total 
natural renewable water resources in most of the 
countries analysed, but they could reach the limit 
in irrigation-dependent agricultural economies, 
such as Egypt. Irrigation expansion proves to be a 
limiting factor to the increase of water 
consumption in future years, with the agricultural 
sector being the largest water consumer in the 
region. Consequently, economic development and 
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social stability would require more sustainable 
economic activities, less-water-consuming and 
technically efficient irrigated agriculture and, in 
turn, the implementation of water-saving policies 
and improved water governance. 
As was highlighted in Bosello et al. (2013), the 
main policy implication is the increasing need for 
an integrated water planning and management 
approach in the whole Euro-Mediterranean region, 
which is currently lacking. However, some 
changes started to be seen in the dynamics of water 
planning whereby more emphasis started to be 
given to: i) demand management rather than the 
sole reliance on finding new sources of supply, ii) 
a growing awareness of the importance of 
preventing and mitigating various types of water 
conflicts, iii) a growing emphasis on incorporating 
ecological values into water policy, iv) a re-
emphasis on meeting basic human needs for water 
services, v) the importance of stakeholders’ 
participation and vi) a conscious breaking of the 
ties between economic growth and water use.  
The EU-SEMC cooperation can be crucial to 
promote and enhance these outcomes. Direct 
financial and technical support can be provided by 
the EU when resources in SEMCs are lacking. This 
would be particularly appropriate to foster 
irrigation modernisation and sustain the huge 
investment needed. Technical and agronomic 
drivers will not be sufficient, however. Institutions 
need to be adapted, governance improved and 
habits themselves changed. More specifically, 
institutional reforms should be implemented that 
promote water users’ associations  and 
participatory irrigation management approaches; 
land tenure arrangements need to be revised with 
specific attention to well defined property rights; 
and new lifestyles aimed at conserving water (e.g. 
the ‘Mediterranean diet’) have to be promoted. 
Another area where appropriate resource 
management and preservation can offer not only 
environmental benefits, which are often difficult to 
quantify, but also direct and tangible economic 
development opportunities is that of 
biodiversity/ecosystem protection. Collecting 
precise quantitative evidence on SEMCs’ 
expenditure devoted to this activity is particularly 
difficult due to the scattered and often lacking 
information. Nonetheless, it can be estimated that 
the region as a whole is devoting roughly 0.013% 
of its GDP to the preservation-management of 
biodiversity, but with large differences across the 
countries. 
A scenario fulfilling minimal requirements of 
sustainability would require that at least the 
existing resources under some form of legal 
protection are properly managed and preserved. 
This would require the SEMCs’ budgets devoted to 
protect area conservation/ management to rise to a 
range between 0.1% and 0.3% of GDP. 
A fully-fledged adaptation strategy for the Euro-
Mediterranean is necessary to respond to these 
long term challenges.  
A Future EU Policy Response Agenda towards 
a sustainable Euro-Mediterranean in 2030 
The policy recommendations to shape the EU 
policy response towards the Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean countries, stemming from the 
MEDPRO research conclusions, are organised and 
presented in the form of a “Future EU Policy 
Response Agenda for a sustainable Euro-
Mediterranean”. The agenda is intended to cope 
with the possible transitions towards sustainable 
development, listing the measures that are intended 
to avoid the unfavourable red transition on one 
side, and those that are aimed to support the 
favourable blue and green transitions on the other 
side. 
As was previously explained, a no-action policy 
will drive the region towards a red transition with 
disastrous political and socio-economic 
implications. 
To set the transition path from the red towards the 
blue and the green, the EU (and in coordination 
with the EU member states) should provide a 
decisive political message for the SEMCs that 
provides a comprehensive vision towards a more 
sustainable transition. This can be done at a high-
level conference of EU institutions, the Arab 
League and any other relevant regional 
organisations and Heads of State of the Euro-
Mediterranean countries and any other relevant 
stakeholder. This political message will set the 
headlines for a new Euro-Mediterranean vision 
towards a green and/or blue transition. 
To avoid the red transition, the EU should firmly 
assist SEMCs in their political transitions towards 
fully democratic regimes and away from failed 
attempts at democratisation, radicalisation of 
conflicts and wider gaps between both shores of 
the Mediterranean.  
The critical period to deliver the package of red 
transition avoidance measures is from 2011 to 
2015. 
A full Euro-Mediterranean Partnership towards a 
sustainable transition in the SEMCs should offer 
indeed a short-term and longer-term response to 
the region. Such a Partnership should be devised 
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and agreed between the EU and the SEMC partners 
that wish and are willing to pursue such a 
fundamental step.  
It must be based on a true partnership anchored in 
co-decision, the co-ownership and co-development 
processes.  
In the short-term, a differentiated action plan is 
needed to support the countries willing to embark 
on (and to continue) anchoring democracy, human 
rights, social justice, good governance and the rule 
of law in their political transitions underway. This 
is the case for Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon 
and Jordan. For Egypt, the latest military coup, 
although driven by large-scale opposition and 
massive popular revolts, should not derail the 
democratisation process in the country, as has been 
largely promised by the high military officials. 
However, it is important that the democratic 
process is kept on track. 
For countries, where democratic transitions have 
not been initiated, the partnership will be delayed 
until there is a commitment from the countries in 
question. In Syria, a decisive diplomatic action by 
the EU (in close coordination with the EU member 
states) is needed to halt the conflict. In Algeria, the 
EU should continue the diplomatic route to ensure 
that democracy is under way. In Israel and 
Palestine, the EU must take a strong position and 
decisive action to intermediate towards a two-state 
solution. In Turkey, following the recent mass 
revolts and the rather strong position of the 
government, the EU should reassess its position 
vis-à-vis the accession talks.  
This differentiated short-term Euro-Mediterranean 
action plan will have three pillars: technical 
assistance, a transition fund and an independent 
monitoring function. The technical assistance will 
mainly deal with the support in anchoring 
democracy and rule of law and support socio-
economic reforms towards more sustainable paths. 
A transition fund (in coordination with all member 
states, the Deauville Partnership and others) will 
support countries under budgetary pressures and 
the strain of diminished market confidence due to a 
lack of stability. Finally, independent monitoring 
will take place via regular visits of independent 
experts from the Euro-Mediterranean region to the 
countries to assess progress in key areas of 
political and socio-economic reforms.  
Over time, when there is certainty that political and 
socio-economic reforms are underway, then the 
conditionality principle will be lifted.     
In the medium to longer term, comprehensive 
socio-economic agreements will be mutually 
agreed towards a sustainable future between the 
EU and its partner countries in the region. The 
implementation of custom unions, mobility 
partnerships (with no conditions of readmission 
and alike), common education, R&D programmes 
and exchanges, deep and comprehensive trade 
agreements (while considering competitive 
vulnerabilities), energy transition and climate 
change adaptation programmes, infrastructure 
investments will drive the region towards the 
‘blue’ and ‘green’ transition pathways of the 
partnership agenda. These initiatives will help 
smooth the risks of radical conflict and enhance the 
integration between economies and societies of the 
northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean.  
Shared cultural initiatives could be envisaged to 
strengthen human ties, such as for instance the 
creation of a Euro-Mediterranean citizenship 
school, with programmes on common sustainable 
development issues, values and goals, open to all 
citizens, especially youth. Such a school would 
help citizens from both shores of the 
Mediterranean to meet and learn to assess together 
with experts the acceptability of public policies 
and programmes, with the aim of increasing 
democratic participation capability and exchange 
of experiences. To be sustainable, the school 
should include courses for young and ‘citizen 
summer school’ sessions for adults. The permanent 
courses should focus on co-democracy building, 
both in theory and in practice, e.g. techniques for 
deliberative democracy and facilitation. 
The summer school could focus on sustainable co-
development challenges, and involve voluntary 
candidates and/or panels of people randomly 
selected to be involved in citizens’ conferences 
and/or participatory assessment of sustainability 
research and policy in key sectors (energy, water, 
etc.), e.g. to support policy discussions in the 
national  parliaments. The school could be located 
in Malta, as this is a central location in the 
Mediterranean (a ‘blue’ place), and shows some 
practical advantages, e.g. existing infrastructure 
and services for teaching English (the common 
language to be used for such international schools), 
the presence of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Mediterranean (PAM) and the role the Maltese 
government has recently played to foster EU-Arab 
League cooperation.  
Under the blue transition, the EU would assist 
SEMCs in their economic and social modernisation 
and in building South-South cooperation and 
integration for common sustainable development 
purposes. This is to prepare for a more balanced 
cooperation, the so-called ‘Euro-Mediterranean 
Alliance’, where both regions will be represented 
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by separate institutions (the European institutions 
for the EU and Mediterranean institutions/Arab 
institutions for SEMCs).   
The critical period to deliver the blue transition 
package is until 2020, in order to enhance the 
human capital endowment, MSMEs development 
and employability in the region, and trade 
integration between SEMCs, and build their 
capacity to cooperate with the EU on an equal 
basis in a sustainable transition pathway to 2030. 
Over time, a group of countries in the SEM would 
enhance cooperation with each other and with 
other regions such the Gulf States and form a 
stand-alone regional organisation with its own 
institutions and structures. The Arab League and 
other sub-regional institutions such as the Arab 
Maghreb Union that may emerge, could take a 
more active role to achieve this objective.  
The EU would support south-south regional 
integration through enhancing technical assistance 
and capacity-building initiatives of regional 
institutions.   
The EU will upgrade its Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership with individual countries into a 
regional one, consisting of a regional FTA, co-
investment agreements, targeted mobility 
partnerships, research and innovation, energy and 
environment agreements between the EU and the 
newly formed Arab Mediterranean region. 
With the completion of this transition, the ENP 
bilateral approach becomes mostly obsolete and 
the UfM is reinvigorated to lead the EU-SEM 
integration, with the membership extended to other 
countries such as the Gulf States, and a list of 
projects would be mutually decided, agreed and 
co-financed. This change would favour multilateral 
approaches of co-investment, co-financing, 
mobility, etc. 
Under the green transition, the aim is to build the 
Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area (EMEA) on 
the basis of enhanced partnership schemes with an 
emphasis on energy, environment/water and socio-
economic areas.  
The critical period to deliver the package is from 
now until 2030, which is the time frame for large 
programmes and infrastructure investments in the 
energy, transport, ICT, water and environment 
(including adaptation to climate change) to be 
implemented and produce their effects. This 
transition rests on the twin conditions of a 
reinforcement of EU common policies and the 
adoption by SEMCs of the EU’s integration model 
of development. The Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership would be upgraded to convey a clear 
strategy towards SEMCs that would ultimately 
seek to achieve deeper integration and full mobility 
of goods, people and capital by 2030 within the 
Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area (EMEA).  
This form of integration would emphasise tackling 
non-tariff barriers and progressively achieving 
comprehensive regulatory harmonisation in areas 
such as technical barriers to trade (TBT), sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures (SPS), competition 
policy, industrial policies, research cooperation, 
company law and public procurement. Encouraged 
by the clear prospect of forming a Euro-
Mediterranean Economic Area, SEMCs would 
progressively establish a Customs Union with the 
EU and implement the EU acquis while 
strengthening socio-economic, political, scientific 
and cultural ties amongst themselves.  
Commitments under bilateral Euro-Mediterranean 
partnerships would rise. Structural/cohesion funds 
would be earmarked to support reform programs, 
national, regional infrastructure projects and 
regional development. A key role will be played by 
cooperation in energy, the environment and 
adaptation to climate change. Renewable energy 
and energy-efficiency projects in the SEMCs could 
stimulate enhanced EU-Mediterranean partnerships 
in socio-economic areas, similar to the case of the 
European Coal and Steel Community, which 
sparked Europe’s post-World War II integration. 
EU-SEMC energy cooperation could be enhanced 
and better developed by setting a new “Euro-
Mediterranean Energy Transition Strategy”.  
Given the fact that climate change impacts in the 
Mediterranean are similar on both shores, efforts 
should be taken to reach coordinated and common 
adaptation policies. This could take the form of 
common research projects, regular cooperation 
meetings at the highest political level, joint 
information campaigns, meetings of researchers, 
practitioners and policy-makers in the climate 
impact community and adaptation case studies on 
both shores of the Mediterranean. Thereby, 
decision-makers could learn from the experiences 
of others and reach their own decisions on a better 
knowledge base. 
Furthermore, a comprehensive and legally binding 
agreement on how to handle Mediterranean 
adaptation issues could be agreed and ratified by 
states from both shores. This would include e.g. 
migration issues and the coordinated regulation of 
CO2 emissions.  
Under such a vision, the Mediterranean sea will be 
the link between two prosperous and peaceful 
civilisations that would benefit future generations 
to come.  
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Annex 1. Assumptions on population, infrastructure, political risk and trade under the four scenarios 
 Populationa Infrastructureb Riskc Traded 
BaU 
Scenario 
Continuation of past trends Continuation of past trends Continuation of past trends Continuation of past trends 
Euro-Med 
Union 
scenario  
-Population marginally falls in 
SEMCs 
- Labour force marginally 
increases in SEMCs due to 
increased female participation 
-Labour force marginally 
increases in the EU due to 
migration from SEMCs 
-SEMCs invest in infrastructure and human capital (5.96% 
of GDP) 
-EU funds directed to infrastructure and human capital 
investments in the SEMCs 
-Infrastructure investments affect total factor productivity, 
increase demand for investment goods and increase capital 
stock of specific sectors 
-Investments in human capital increase labour productivity 
-Sovereign risk of SEMCs decreases as 
governance assumed to improve 
-Governance improvements lead to lower 
risk parameter in the SEMCs 
-Import duties and  NTBs removed between 
SEMCs and between SEMCs and EU 
-Logistic performance improved in the SEMCs 
reducing transport costs between SEMCs and EU 
-Electricity exports from the SEMCs to the EU 
Euro-Med 
Alliance 
scenario  
-Population marginally increases 
in SEMCs 
-Labour force marginally 
increases in SEMCs due to 
increased female participation 
-Female labour participation 
rates higher than in BAU but 
lower than in Euro-Med Union 
scenario 
-SEMCs invest in infrastructure and human capital (5.06% 
of reference GDP) 
-Rest of Middle East countries’ and emerging Asian 
economies’ funds directed to infrastructure and human 
capital investments in the SEMCs 
-Infrastructure investments affect total factor productivity, 
increase demand for investment goods and increase capital 
stock of specific sectors 
-Investments in human capital affect labour productivity 
-Governance improvements lead to lower 
risk parameter in the SEMCs 
-Risk parameter for SEMCs higher than in 
Euro-Med Union scenario 
-Import duties and NTBs removed between SEMCs 
and between SEMCs and Middle East countries 
and emerging Asian economies. NTBs lowered 
with Brazil and Russia 
 -Logistic performance improve in SEMCs 
reducing transport costs between SEMCs and 
Middle East countries and emerging Asian 
economies 
 
Threats 
scenario  
-Population falls in SEMCs 
-Largest population fall from all 
alternative scenarios 
-Capital destruction in the SEMCs in 2015 
-Reduction in government investment in 2015 
-Resumption of investments from 2020 onwards 
-Change in consumption patterns in the SEMCs 
-Governance deterioration leads to higher 
risk in the SEMCs 
-Conflict hinders perceived risk for the 
SEMCs 
-Increase of NTBs between SEMCs and EU 
-Reduced tourism and exports of SEMCs 
- Logistic performance worsens in SEMCs 
increasing transport costs between SEMCs and EU, 
rest of Middle East countries and emerging Asian 
economies 
-Import duties remain in place 
a Assumptions computed from Groenewold et al. (2013). 
b Assumptions computed from Carruthers (2013). 
c Assumptions computed from Colombo (2010). 
d Assumptions computed from Ghoneim et al. (2012). 
Source: Paroussos et al. (2013). 
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Future EU Policy Response Agenda for a resilient and sustainable development of the Euro-Mediterranean region 
 
      RED TRANSITION       BLUE TRANSITION     GREEN TRANSITION 
Rationale For the EU to assist SEMCs in their political transitions towards fully 
democratic regimes and avoid the radicalisation of conflicts 
The critical period to deliver the package is from 2011 to 2015. 
 
For the EU to assist SEMCs in their economic and 
social modernisation processes, and build South-
South cooperation on common sustainable 
development purposes 
To prepare for a more balanced Euro-Mediterranean 
cooperation 
The critical period to deliver the package is from 
2011 until 2020, in order to enhance the human 
capital endowment, SME development and 
employability in the South, and trade integration 
between SEMCs, and build their capacity to 
cooperate with the EU on a similar green transition 
pathway to 2030. 
To build enhanced Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
schemes in energy, environment/water and socio-
economic areas 
The critical period to deliver the package is from 2011 
until 2030, which is the time required for large 
programmes and infrastructure investments in the 
energy, transport, ICT, water and environment 
(including adaptation to climate change) to be 
implemented and produce their effects. 
New 
approaches 
recommended 
as a result of 
MEDPRO 
research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A full Euro-Mediterranean Partnership towards a sustainable transition in 
the SEMCs should offer a short-term and longer-term response to the 
region. Such a Partnership should be devised and agreed between the EU 
and the SEMC partners that wish and are willing to pursue such a 
fundamental step. It is based on co-decision, co-ownership and co-
development.  
In the short-term, a differentiated action plan to support the countries 
willing to embark on (and to continue) anchoring democracy, human 
rights, social justice, good governance and the rule of law in their 
political transitions underway. This differentiated short-term Euro-
Mediterranean action plan will have three pillars: technical assistance, 
transition fund and an independent monitoring function.  
In the longer term, comprehensive economic agreements towards a 
sustainable future will be mutually agreed between the EU and the 
partner country. The implementation of mobility partnerships, common 
education, research and development programmes and exchanges, deep 
and comprehensive trade agreements, renewable energy and climate 
change adaptation programmes, infrastructure investments (on the “blue” 
and “transition” pathways of the cooperation agenda) will help to smooth 
the risks of radical conflicts and promote the integration between the 
economies and societies of the North and South shores of the 
Mediterranean. 
Regional economic and financial integration, human 
development programmes and targeted mobility 
partnerships should be encouraged.  
Over time a group of countries in the SEM would 
enhance cooperation with each other and with other 
regions such as the Gulf States and act as a stand-
alone regional organisation with its own structures. 
The Arab League, the Maghreb Union and others can 
take the lead in this transition. 
In this transition, the ENP becomes obsolete and the 
UfM could be reinvigorated to become the vehicle of 
integration if the membership is extended to other 
countries such as the Gulf States and a list of projects 
is mutually agreed upon. This change would favour 
triangular approaches of co-investment, mobility, etc. 
A Euro-Mediterranean human capital development and 
mobility strategy  
A Euro-Mediterranean economic integration strategy 
A comprehensive infrastructure investment initiative 
A Euro-Mediterranean sectoral development initiative  
A Euro-Mediterranean financial market initiative  
A Euro-Mediterranean energy transition strategy  
A Euro-Mediterranean environment adaptation strategy  
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